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Introduction
In recent years, the global discussion on
migration and asylum has evolved from
polarization of perspectives and mistrust, to
improving partnerships and fostering
cooperation between countries and regions.
The paradigm has shifted from control and
security exclusively to an increased
awareness of the ramifications of migration
in development and labour markets, the
increasing demographic gap,1 and the
*Migration and Development Expert for the
Intra-ACP Migration Facility, an EU funded
project, which aims at supporting 12 ACP
pilot countries to mainstream migration into
development, focusing on South-South flows.
1 The world’s population reached 7.2 billion
people (2013), of which 60 per cent lived in
Asia, 15 per cent in Africa, 10 per cent in
dangers of exclusion faced by migrant
workers (regular or irregular). Eastern
Europe will suffer the biggest population
decline in the coming years, and Nigeria’s
population will reach one billion by 2100. In
Europe, the work replacement ratio will be
two pensioners for one active worker. It has
become clear that these facts cannot be
ignored and that there is a need for greater
convergence of policies (migration/mobility,
fundamental rights, and economic growth),
with a migrant-centred approach.2.
The assumption that Europe will remain a
geopolitical and economic hub that attracts
immigrants at all skill levels might not hold
water in the long run. The evolving
demographic and economic changes have
made it evident that the competitiveness of
the EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also at
stake, particularly if an adaptable workforce
with the necessary skills is not secured in
view of shortfalls in skill levels and because
of serious labour mismatches. Therefore, it
is the right moment to develop more
strategic and long-term migration policies
that take into account the evolving position
of Europe and its neighbours in the world.
By the same token, labour market strategies
that meet needs and promote integration of
regular migrants are still a pending task for
the Member States (MS) in terms of the free
movement of people, but also in relation
with neighbouring and partner countries.
Europe, 9 per cent in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 5 per cent in Northern America, and
1 per cent in Oceania. Eastern Europe will suffer
the biggest population decline in the coming
years, and Nigeria’s population will reach one
billion by 2100.
2 Intra-ACP Migration Facility, Brussels, 2014.
1Global human mobility and the EU role: a
greater coherence and convergence of
policies, with a migrant-centered approach
The link between migration and development
entered the political debate only ten years ago
even though it had been addressed in academic
literature a long time before that. In the absence
of global governance of migration, this link
attracted immense attention at the international
level and created momentum for the first High
Level Dialogue on Migration and Development
(HLD) under the auspices of the United Nations
in 2006,3and subsequently the Global Forum on
Migration and Development (GFMD).4
3
http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/abou
t.shtml
4 The GFMD is one of the most prominent
international platforms available for States to discuss
migration and development. The GFMD seeks to
foster an informal exchange of experience among
states as well as to strengthen cooperation between
States and other stakeholders (international
organizations, civil society, and private sector) in the
domain of migration and development on a voluntary
basis. More specifically, the added-value of the
GFMD consists in its focus on the inter-linkages
between migration and development, the fact that its
participating States represent all regions of the world,
and in its targeted efforts to serve as a catalyst for
concrete bilateral and multilateral projects.
Conceived as a process unfolding outside the UN, the
Forum was born on the initiative of the then UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan in the follow-up to the
2006 “High-level Dialogue on Migration and
Development“, in which the findings of the report of
the “Global Commission on International Migration”
were discussed. The GFMD is underpinned by a
supporting framework composed of four different
bodies. The Chair-in-Office is responsible for the
preparatory process and the actual conduct of the
Forum. The Chair receives guidance and support
from the Troika of past, present, and future Chairs.
The Steering Group, comprising 35 States, provides
strategic and political support to the GFMD. Finally,
the “Friends of the Forum”, open to all UN Member
States, ensures that all States keep pace with the
The recent GFMD, under the Swedish Chair
(14-16 May, 2014) focused on how to “unlock
the potential of migration for inclusive
development”.5 Protection against abuses,
diaspora engagement, and honouring migrants’
contribution are key elements of a discussion
that has evolved. On the road to strengthening a
bottom-up multilateral system with an agenda
for action, it has become clearer that policy
choices have to be well informed and evidence-
based if migration is to be leveraged for
development. This states-led forum has
facilitated their creation of a common
understanding and a framework where they can
continuously discuss migration issues and
exchange best practices.
Since its creation in 2007, three EU MS
(Belgium in 2007, Greece in 2009 and Sweden
in 2014) and one member of the Union’s single
market (Switzerland in 2011)6 have hosted the
Forum. On July 1, 2014, a Mediterranean and
EU candidate country, Turkey, will take over the
Chairmanship of the GFMD from Sweden for a
period of 18 months (until December 2015)7.
Traditionally a transit and source country for
migration, in the past years Turkey has become
GFMD process. UN agencies and associated
international organizations enjoy the possibility of
obtaining observer status in this body.
5 GFMD 2013-2014 Concept Paper, 30 April 2013,
www.gfmd.org.
6 The relations between Switzerland and the
European Union (EU) are based on a series of
bilateral treaties whereby the Swiss Confederation
has adopted various provisions of EU law in order to
participate in the Union’s single market. In February
2014, the Swiss voted in a referendum to introduce
quotas for all migrants wishing to enter Switzerland.
Such a quota system would, if implemented, violate
the agreement between Switzerland and the EU on
the free movement of persons, and require the
renegotiation of the various bilateral agreements if
they are to remain in force.
7 http://www.gfmd.org/meetings/turkey2014-
2015#sthash.Rcex2Yup.dpuf.
2an attractive destination country due to its
economic growth and social development.
One main focus within the GFMD has been on
promoting policy coherence between migration
and development, with a view to mainstreaming
migration into development policy and
development into migration policy. On the one
hand, these discussions have concerned
institutional issues such as finding the right
structures and lines of communication within
governments and beyond in relation to other
stakeholders (including the involvement of civil
society). On the other hand, they have focused
on policy. Recommendations have included
formulating national policy and action plans on
how to promote the synergies between migration
and development. Efforts have included
mainstreaming migration into activities to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs),8 or other development initiatives, with
the ultimate goal of including migration in
broader national development planning
processes, in the formulation of country
strategies for bilateral development cooperation
as well as in sectorial planning.
The GFMD has a parallel civil society forum,
which is gaining momentum in promoting the
human rights of migrants, and giving a stronger
voice to migrants and diaspora. During the
GFMD in Stockholm a new migration and
development civil society network (“MADE”)9
was launched with a five-year action plan, which
advocates:
 Safe labour migration and reform of the
8 When reference is made to the MDGs, special
recognition must be made to migrants as agents of
development, epitomizing the freedom to genuinely
strive to achieve the kind of life they aspire to for
themselves and their families.  By moving from
countries with a low human development index
(HDI) to a higher HDI country, migrants experience a
15-fold increase in income; a doubling in education
enrollment rate; and a 16-fold reduction in child
mortality.
9 www.madenetwork.org
migrant worker recruitment industry.;
 Migrants and diaspora as entrepreneurs,
social investors, and policy advocates
and partners , for human development in
countries of origin, heritage and
destination;
 Rights-based global governance of
migration and development and
ensuring that migration and migrants’
positive potential contribution to
development is recognized and upheld
in the post-2015 agenda;
 Protection of migrant rights, en route
and in countries of destination.
Recently, the issue of South-South migration
and development policies was discussed in-
depth in the GFMD process. The focus was on
most recent data reflecting the full range of
human mobility in the South-South context,
including related drivers of such migration;
harnessing the development potential of labour
mobility among countries, governance capacity
gaps, and environment-induced migration. A
number of policy guidance tools have been
developed, including tools for mainstreaming
migration into development planning; a
repository of migration profiles as well as a
handbook on engaging the diaspora for
development. In order to promote the inclusion
of migration in the Post-2015 Development
Agenda, the GFMD has pointed to the need of
indicators to measure and monitor the concrete
effects of migration on specific development
outcomes (e.g. current MDGs).10 In this context,
migration is considered as an “enabler” of
development in countries of origin, mainly due
to the weight of remittances in GDP, but also
because of its catalytic role for improving
migrants’ skills, thus empowering them as active
members of their own diaspora.
10 Thematic Recollection from the GFMD 2007-
2012, GMFD (2013).
3In the Southern Mediterranean region, there are
several countries that are actively discussing this
issue on a national level. Algeria is analysing the
topic of “participatory monitoring for
accountability”; Jordan and Tunisia are looking
into how to improve “partnerships with civil
society”; Turkey is thinking of new ways to
“engage with the private sector”; and Morocco is
focusing on “culture and development”.
Source: The World We Want, UNDG 2014
This approach of working together on issues that
enjoy consensus has proven beneficial for
building trust and moving the agenda forward
not only in the framework of the GFMD, but
also in the HLD.
Among the issues that attracted interest in
practical collaboration during the HLD11 were:
 Portability of benefits accrued by
migrants while working abroad;
 Reining in abusive recruitment practices
by establishing a voluntary set of
ground-rules for international
recruitment (IRIS)12;
11 Newland Kathleen (2013).
12 The International Recruitment Integrity System
 Strengthening protection for migrant
domestic workers;
 Involving diasporas more deeply in
development work;
 Creating an agreed framework for
protecting and assisting migrants caught
up in crises;
 Creating a place for migration in the
post-2015 Development Agenda.
The EU is playing quite an active role in the
GFMD, as it did in the HLD ofNovember 2013,
by contributing financially on a regular basis and
working with MS to speak with one voice,
increasing the effectiveness of its external action
and developing a shared vision that includes the
broader term of “mobility”. In addition to the
delivery of EU statements at the GFMD annual
(IRIS) is an international voluntary “ethical
recruitment” framework that benefits all stakeholders
in the labour migration process. IRIS will provide a
platform for addressing unfair recruitment and bridge
international regulatory gaps governing labour
recruitment in countries of origin and destination.
IRIS aims to create a public-private alliance of like-
minded governments, employers, recruiters and other
partners committed to ethical recruitment. It will
develop a voluntary accreditation framework so that
its members can be recognized as bona fide fair
recruiters and distinguish themselves from
unscrupulous intermediaries. Accreditation will be
based on adherence to common principles for ethical
recruitment and a code of conduct which will
include: a) No fee charging to job seekers, b) No
retention of workers’ passports or identity
documents, and c) A requirement for transparency in
their labour supply chain. Job seekers will have better
information regarding ethical recruitment through an
information portal and publicly available roster of
accredited IRIS members internationally. IRIS will
administer a complaints and referral mechanism to
assist victims of unethical or illegal recruiters to file
grievances with the appropriate authorities. For more
information: http://iris.iom.int
4meetings, its thematic contributions focused
notably on labour mobility (2007 in Belgium),
the role of diaspora organisations for
development (2008 in the Philippines), the
promotion of the concept of national Migration
Profiles as a basis for evidence-based migration
policy (2009 in Greece), circular migration and
the promotion of new forms of global
partnerships, including mobility partnerships
(2010 in Mexico) and addressing irregular
migration through coherent migration and
development strategies (2011 in Switzerland).13
The link between migration and development is
present in numerous official EU documents,
such as the European Pact on Migration and
Asylum, the European Neighbourhood
Instrument, the Cotonou Agreement, the Joint
Africa-EU Strategy (and the so-called Thematic
Partnership on Migration, Mobility and
Employment), and most importantly, the Global
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).
The EU’s vision has been expressed at the
GAMM (2011), as the “overarching framework
of the EU’s external migration and asylum
policy” that helps the EU and its MS to focus on
concrete and operational results. Two examples
of those results are the facilitation of
international labour mobility, and the inclusion
of migration in the post-2015 development
agenda. During the GFMD in Stockholm, the
newly developed Migration and Development
Policy and Practice Database will be launched,
which includes numerous EU MS examples.
The Commission believes that “the GAMM
should be truly global. Dialogue and cooperation
on migration issues should be pursued across the
globe with all interested and relevant partners
13http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_
geneva/migration_asylum/gfmd/index_en.htm
based on their and the EU’s respective
priorities”.14 One could argue that this statement
arises from the realization that the world has
become an irremediably interdependent space.
Political change and instability; climate change,
better transport and communications; gaps in
living and working conditions; a population
deficit (or bonus);15 the role of diaspora in
development and business creation; and
increased labour shortages in formal and
informal markets are some of the factors
influencing migration flows.  It is in this light
that the EC recognized that Home Affairs issues
needed to be embedded in the EU’s overall
external policy and vice versa16, in an effort to
introduce some consistency and coherence, but
most importantly, to anticipate future policy
needs and steer the EU boat towards safer
shores. In order for the freedom of movement to
work properly, be credible, and build upon
citizens’ trust, the EC stresses that European
internal security is intrinsically linked to the EU
14 Communication from the Commission COM(2011)
743 final, 18.11.2011.
15 “The United Nations Population Division has
dramatically revised its projections for what will
happen in the next 90 years. The populations of most
rich countries will shrink and age (with a few
important exceptions), poorer countries will expand
rapidly and, maybe most significant of all, Africa will
see a population explosion nearly unprecedented in
human history. (…) the world of 2100 will look very
different than today’s, with implications for
everyone. It will be a place where today's dominant,
developed economies will be increasingly focused on
supporting the elderly, where the least developed
countries are transformed by population booms and
where Africa, for better or worse, is more important
than ever.” Excerpt from the article “The amazing,
surprising, Africa-driven future of the Earth, in 9
charts”, by Max Fisher, Washington Post blogs, 16
July 2013.
16 Communication from the Commission COM
(2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.
5borders, and dependent on stronger cooperation
and partnership with third countries.
At the same time, the GAMM takes a “migrant-
centred approach” in the sense that “human
rights of migrants are a crosscutting dimension
of relevance to all four pillars of GAMM”.17 For
the first time, it is clearly acknowledged that the
relevance and sustainability of policies depend
on their capacity to respond to the aspirations
and problems of migrants, who are seen not as a
burden but as contributors to the labour market,
possessing an entrepreneurial spirit of sorts.
In the wake of the HLD, Sir Peter D.
Sutherland18 underlined that “the international
community is slowly leaving behind outmoded
notions about human mobility to accept the
restless and inventive nature of the human spirit.
The current patchwork system of international
mobility just does not work, since it empowers
the wrong people (traffickers, abusive employers
and officials, etc.), undermines the human and
labour rights of migrants, depletes public trust in
effectiveness of the government, and
undermines our ability to design policies to
achieve development goals. That is why it is
being revised, to catch up with the
advancements in the domain of movement of
capital, goods and information”.19
Internationally, progress has been made on the
normative front with the entry into force of the
UN Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime and its supplementary Protocols on
Smuggling and Trafficking (2000), the UN
Convention on the protection of the human
rights of migrant workers and their families
17 Ibid.
18 Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General on Migration and Development.
19 Migration (#3-2013), UN Chronicle.
(2003) and the ILO (International Labour
Organziation) Domestic Workers Convention
(C.189). Only Germany and Italy have ratified
C.189, and not all MS have ratified the 2000
Convention and its supplementary Protocols,
probably because a new EU Directive on
trafficking (2011) was in the making.20 As major
destination countries, most EU MS have not
ratified the 2003 UN Convention, which
regulates issues such as detention, mass
deportations, etc. for regular and irregular
migrants. It is also worth noting that the number
of countries that ratified the second Convention
but have not yet reported to date is quite high.21
However, the EU relies on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights in ensuring the fulfillment
of international human rights obligations. The
Charter is binding on the EU institutions when
adopting and implementing legislation, as well
as on the MS when they act within the scope of
the EU law, and it also incorporates “European
values”.22. In the international arena, the
monitoring bodies of the other international
Human Rights Treaties23 ask States to report on
human rights of migrants in relation to those
instruments, facilitating the task of gathering
information on human rights abuses. In this
context, Commissioner Malmström24 highlighted
20 Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011.
21 “Preliminary Statement on the Report of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights on Strengthening
the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body
System”, Committee on the Protection of the Human
Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families,
Seventeenth Session, 10-14 September 2012.
22 COM (2014) 154 final, 11.3.2014.
23 Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights/Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICCPR, ICESC), Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), and Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
24 Malmström, Cecilia, 2013.
6the need to uphold and ensure the
implementation of relevant international human
rights instruments, since it benefits all
stakeholders involved (migrants, home society,
and society in which migrants live and work).
The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of
Migrants, François Crépeau, has repeatedly
warned about the dangers of criminalising
irregular migrants. After the October 2013
Lampedusa tragedy, he urged all EU MS to
“urgently adopt a new approach to migration
that places the rights of migrants at the
forefront”, by prioritising a “new human rights
framework in the development of their migration
policies”.25
More recently, the Fundamental Rights
Agency’s (FRA) paper “The Criminalisation of
Irregular Migrants”26 recommended that
Member States treat irregular migrants, whose
asylum applications have been refused,
according to the safeguards contained in the
25 United Nations Press Release (2013).
26 http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2014/fra-paper-
criminalisation-irregular-migrants. This paper looks
at the impact of such measures on fundamental rights,
such as the right to liberty and security of a person,
human dignity, the right to life, right to an effective
remedy, and access to social rights, such as housing.
Other recommendations are: a) To promote access to
justice, migrants who have become victims of
exploitation and abuse (gender- based violence) need
to have a residence permit that is not dependent on
the perpetrator; b) Anyone giving humanitarian
assistance such as rescue at sea or providing
humanitarian services such as food, shelter, medical
care or legal advice to migrants in an irregular
situation should not have to risk punishment for
facilitating irregular entry or stay; c) Renting
accommodation to irregular migrants without the
intention of preventing the migrant’s removal should
not be considered facilitation of stay.
Return Directive:27:
In specific cases, and when less coercive
measures are not sufficient, Member States may
detain a third-country national during the return
procedure if s/he risks fleeing or
avoids/obstructs the preparation of the return or
removal process. Detentions are ordered in
writing by administrative or judicial authorities
and must be reviewed regularly. The detention
period must be as short as possible and not
more than six months. Only in particular
circumstances, when the removal of a third-
country national might exceed the time limit set,
may Member States prolong detention up to a
maximum of 12 months. Specialised detention
facilities are to be used for the purpose;
however, if this is not feasible, Member States
may use prison accommodation with separate
quarters for the third-country nationals.
Bearing this rights-based approach in mind, the
GAMM does not seem to convincingly deliver
the ‘migrant-centeredness’ discourse in practical
tools. The weight that some pillars have over
others and the quid pro quo nature of Mobility
Partnerships (MPs) is a matter of concern for
civil society,28 and other observers,29 but also for
the EU, which has identified the need for more
balance by including more actions with regard to
“legal migration, human rights and refugee
protection”.30 In particular, the implementation
of readmission agreements should be scrutinized
to make sure that human rights of migrants were
not violated in transit and origin countries.
27 Directive 2008/115/EC.
28 Marie Martin, (2012).
29 “The contours of the EU’s external dimensions of
migration policy continue to be primarily insecurity,
(im)mobility and conditionality driven.” in Sergio
Carrera, Joanna Parkin, and Leonhard den Hertog,
(2013).
30 COM(2014) 96 final, 21.02.2014.
7The recent adoption of the Seasonal Workers
Directive by the European Parliament31 is its
first legal migration dossier since the Lisbon
Treaty,32 and is a great step forward in not only
achieving consensus among MEPs on a “highly
political and sensitive issue”, but also in
providing third country nationals with better
working and living conditions and ultimately
defending their labour rights and avoiding social
dumping. Migrant workers in the Southern MS
will mainly benefit from this new Directive,
which will be transposed into national
legislation within two and a half years time.
Operational tools that ensure legal, ethical, fair
and effective labour matching of EU employers
with third country workers (whether living in
EU or abroad) would be the perfect complement
to the EU legislative framework.33 The EU
Immigration Portal and the MS Employment
Offices are a good source of information for
would be migrants, but mostly useful for mid-
and highly skilled migrants.
Mobility Partnerships and other instruments
in the context of the Global Approach on
Migration and Mobility.
The evolving demographic and economic
changes have made it evident that the
competitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020
Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if an
adaptable workforce with the necessary skills is
not secured in view of shortfalls in skill levels
and serious labour mismatches. Therefore,
labour market strategies for meeting needs and
promoting integration of regular migrants is still
31 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20140203IPR34619/html/More-rights-
and-better-working-conditions-for-non-EU-seasonal-
workers
32 The Treaty entered into force December 1, 2009,
giving the EP more say in the decision-making
process.
33 Vid. International Recruitment Integrity System
(IRIS), http://iris.iom.int.
a pending task for the MS both in terms of the
free movement of people, and also in relation
with neighbouring and partner countries.
Until now, the MS have resisted EC attempts to
harmonise specific aspects of their migration
policies, mainly labour migration which remains
their competence. Clearly, the economic crisis
played against any opening of legal channels for
migrant workers, and favoured more rigid border
and security controls. The conditions for third
country nationals to enter and reside in the EU,
promotion of migrant integration, the fight
against “illegal” migration, and the conclusion
of readmission agreements with third countries
are the few competences that had been ceded to
the EU.
In this sense, the GAMM is an attempt at
migration policy harmonisation. It is a relatively
comprehensive framework for external action on
migration, that allows the EU and its Member
States to be engaged in regional and bilateral
dialogues on migration management with a
broad range of (neighbouring or historically
tied) countries and regions, once shared
priorities have been agreed upon.34.
The GAMM is implemented through: a) several
political instruments, such as the bilateral and
regional policy dialogues35 and action plans
related to the enlargement countries,36 Eastern
partnership countries,37 Southern Mediterranean
34 Ibid. cit.
35 The Prague Process, the Budapest Process, and the
Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum
towards the East; the Africa-EU Partnership on
Migration, Mobility and Employment, and the Rabat
Process in the South; as well as the EU-CELAC
Structured and Comprehensive Dialogue on
Migration and the ACP-EU Migration Dialogue.
36 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia, Kosovo, and Turkey.
37 Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan.
8countries,38 Sub-Saharan countries,39 Asian
countries,40 and other countries;41 b) legal
instruments, such as visa facilitation and
readmission agreements; and c) operational
support and capacity-building via EU agencies
(Frontex, EASO and ETF), technical assistance
facilities (MIEUX and TAIEX), and programme
support (civil society, migrant associations, and
IOs). Traditionally, these regional dialogues
have supported improved communication and
capacity building activities. However, there
seems to be a certain fatigue in several regional
dialogues, given the lack of engagement by the
MS, which indicates the need to be more
targeted and focused on – jointly identified –
added value initiatives.
In its cooperation with third countries,
particularly with the European Neighbourhood,
in the areas of migration and asylum, the EU has
been using specific instruments (“toolbox”) such
as Mobility Partnerships (MPs), and Common
Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs),
Migration Profiles, Visa Facilitation and
Liberalization, Readmission Agreements, and
Regional Development and Protection
Programmes.
In order to strengthen the Southern
Mediterranean partnership, the EU is
specifically promoting the following three
measures:
a) Improve the recognition of skills and
educational levels;
38 Structured Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and
Security have been launched with Tunisia, Morocco,
and Jordan.
39 Progress has been made with Cape Verde, Nigeria
and South Africa. A Regional Protection Program is
being implemented in the Horn of Africa. Ghana has
a CAMM and ECOWAS received financial support
for the effective implementation of the Free
Movement Protocols.
40 China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia.
41 United States and Russia.
b) Offer a dynamic mobility policy
(including visas): liberalized provision
of services, enhanced exchanges of
students and researchers, and intensified
contacts (civil society, businessmen,
journalists, human rights organizations);
c) Structured dialogue on migration,
mobility and security, with mobility
partnerships conditioned by readmission
agreements.
2
ANNEX I
– Mobility Partnerships –
Concluded Discussions
pending
To consider for
2014
To consider once
circumstances
permit
Algeria X
Egypt X
Libya X
Morocco X
Tunisia X
Jordan X
Lebanon X
Syria X
Armenia X
Azerbaijan X
Belarus X
Georgia X
Moldova X
Ukraine X
Cape Verde X
The following candidate MP countries could be considered:
Algeria: In the context of the ongoing negotiations on a new European Neighbourhood Policy
Action Plan, Algeria has expressed its interest to start a dialogue on Migration, Mobility and
Security, in view of possibly eventually entering into structured cooperation with the EU in
the area of migration. Depending on Algeria's willingness to open negotiations with the EU
on a readmission agreement, such framework could be a MP.
Ukraine: Cooperation on migration and mobility with this country is already particularly
advanced, including in the context of the EU-Ukraine visa dialogue, and from its part Ukraine
has not yet expressed an interest in establishing a MP with the EU. However, this option may
be considered in the coming months, depending on the developments in the country.
Belarus: Despite the complex political relations between the EU and Belarus due to i.a.
human rights issues, areas of cooperation do exist and could form the basis for a future
dialogue, e.g. trafficking in human beings, border management and asylum. Furthermore,
9Source: Annexes to the Report from the Commission to the
EP, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – Report on
the implementation of the GAMM 2012-2013
The GAMM relies on “genuine partnership with
third countries, based on mutual trust and shared
interests”.42 In the eyes of the Southern
Mediterranean countries, though, in the short
and medium term Mobility Partnerships offer
few commitments by the EU and the signatory
MS, and limited channels for legal migration
and mobility. In other words, it is a vehicle to
“get the Europeans what they want” via
readmission agreements.
GAMM’s non-binding and flexible nature has
mostly translated into little engagement and
often-timid financial contributions from the MS
in the GAMM cooperation frameworks, such as
Mobility Partnerships. This calls for the roles of
EU actors (EU agencies, EC, and European
External Action Service) and MS to be more
clearly defined and for tangible engagement.
Furthermore, it requires taking distance from
security-oriented approaches that tend to
criminalize migrants, as well as ‘walking the
talk’ of the European values “prevention,
protection, and solidarity”,43 Only in this way,
can GAMM be implemented coherently and
honestly, and thereby pave the way for a future
common migration and asylum policy for the
EU and its neighboUrs.
Asylum in the EU and its external dimension
Five different routes across the Mediterranean
persist as the main gateways for irregular
migrants and asylum seekers to enter EU. The
numbers of crossings differ over time. They are
42 Ibid.
43 President Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 25
October 2013 EUCO 214/13, PRESSE 444 PR PCE
192.
influenced by EU border management responses
as a pull44 or stopping factor, the security
situation in the transit countries and the available
means to cross EU borders (and the
Mediterranean Sea).
In Q3 2013, there were “42,618 detections of
illegal border crossings at the external EU
borders”, a 93% increase compared with the
same quarter in 2012 and a 72% increase
compared to the previous quarter (Q2 2013).
This is the highest increase recorded at any
single quarter since 2008.45 The EU maritime
borders were used even more than at any stage
of the Arab Spring in 2011 with the biggest
increase taking place within the Italian sea
border. Although this increase is not all
attributed to asylum seekers (the number of
asylum seekers in EU total was also the highest
since 2008), it underscores that in the mixed
flows, many persons become asylum seekers
once in the EU.
When GAMM was renewed in November 2011,
the EU took an important step in bringing its
asylum policy and practice to a new level when
dealing with asylum issues in its external
dimension. For the first time, protection had
become a priority and was specifically expressed
that way in one of GAMM’s four main pillars:
 strengthening international protection
systems and the external dimension of
asylum
This meant that the EU’s asylum policy link
with its foreign and development cooperation
policies (where considerable funding was
already being globally used on asylum and
refugee situations) became explicitly stronger.
At the same time, the European Asylum Support
44 “Mare Nostrum saved 20,000 migrants in 6
months”. European External Policy Advisors,
www.eepa.be, 24 April 2014.
45 FRONTEX Fran Quarterly Report Q3 of 2013.
(2014)
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Office46 (EASO) had just become operational
and the EU legislators had foreseen that the new
agency was to play a role in the external
dimension of asylum issues:
“[EASO] …may cooperate with competent
authorities of third countries in technical
matters, in particular with a view to promoting
and assisting capacity building in the third
countries' own asylum and reception systems
and implementing regional protection
programmes, and other actions relevant to
durable solutions.”47
In other words, the EU was walking the talk of
the revised GAMM, by letting EASO respond to
asylum flows in and from the Mediterranean.48
While this was settling into place, the EC, the
Parliament and the Council were putting
together the “Asylum Package”, i.e. the recast
legal framework for the Common European
Asylum System, which needs to be fully
transposed by MS.
In light of the migratory flows stemming from
the “Arab Spring”,49 the Member States reacted
in the Justice and Home Affairs Council by
adding new features to the heated negotiations
on the Dublin Regulation. In their meeting of 8
March 2012,50 they concluded that the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) should be
based on solidarity, which then again would
build on responsibility sharing and mutual trust.
In striving towards a common approach to the
present situation, they came up with a
Mechanism for Early Warning Preparedness and
Crisis Management within the Dublin System.
46 Regulation (EU) No 439/2010.
47 EASO Regulation, Article 7.
48 EASO’s External Action Strategy was adopted in
November 2013.
49 Oxford Dictionary “A series of antigovernment
uprisings in various countries in North Africa and the
Middle East, beginning in Tunisia in December
2010.”
50 Council conclusions (2012).
Although in its conclusions it focused on how
the EU must react to the flows coming from
neighbouring countries, the Justice and Home
Affairs Council still kept in mind that the CEAS
cannot exist in isolation:
“Affirming that a Common European Asylum
System with high protection standards combined
with fair and effective procedures capable of
preventing abuse presupposes effective border
management, well functioning return
arrangements and cooperation with third
countries inter alia to address the root causes
leading to mixed migration flows to the Union”
(Emphasis added)
The negotiations on the Asylum Package
resulted in a legislative framework, which all
could live with and which covers in their
entirety most aspects of the reality of the
Asylum and Reception systems in the Member
States.
However, while MS are translating legislation
into practical implementation, the flows across
the Mediterranean (and other routes) do not stop.
Italy is one of the Member States which is most
affected by the flows across the Mediterranean
at the moment. In the first months of 2014 the
flows have been dramatically higher than the
corresponding period last year.51
After a boat sank off the Italian island
Lampedusa on 3 October 2013 causing the loss
of more than 300 persons, both the EU and Italy
reacted promptly to the specific incident and to
the need to deal with such crossings in the
region. Italy then launched the Sea Operation
51 Agence France-Presse. theguardian.com,
Wednesday 9 April 2014 15.16 BST “Italy says
4,000 immigrants have reached its shores by boat in
the past two days – the highest number since it began
a naval operation to handle the influx after two
shipwrecks last year. "The landings are non-stop and
the emergency is increasingly glaring," the interior
minister, Angelino Alfano, said.”
11
“Mare Nostrum” to tackle the flows and the
operation was characterized as a ''humanitarian
operation'' to ''save human lives'', as well as a
''security'' one.52.
Additionally, immediately after the Justice and
Home Affairs Council of 7-8 October 2013, the
EU set up the “Task Force Mediterranean” under
the lead of the Commission. On the 24-25
October 2013, the European Council invited the
Task Force Mediterranean, also involving MS,
the EEAS and a number of EU Agencies, to
identify priority actions for a more efficient
short-term use of European policies and tools.
As early as the beginning of December 2013, the
Task Force had identified five main areas of
action, which would be actively pursued:
– Actions in cooperation with third
countries;
– Regional protection, resettlement and
reinforced legal avenues for migration to
Europe;
– Stepping up the fight against trafficking,
smuggling and organized crime;
– Reinforced border surveillance
contributing to enhancing the maritime
situational picture and to the protection of
and the saving of lives of migrants in the
Mediterranean;
– Assistance and solidarity with member
states dealing with high migration
pressure.
The Task Force developed a plan and the five
areas are broken down into 38 action points with
different actors leading their implementation,
some short term, other medium and long term.53
Some actions are very specific, e.g. the
Commission set aside funding (including
52 (ANSAmed) – Rome, October 15, 2013- Italy has
launched Operation Mare Nostrum to tackle the
immigration emergency. It will be a ''humanitarian
operation'' to ''save human lives'', Defense Minister
Mario Mauro said, as well as a ''security'' one.
53 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013.
emergency funding) of up to €30m in support of
Italy, including for border surveillance
operations under the Frontex mandate. Other
actions touch upon very broad issues, e.g.
“Political dialogue and diplomatic initiatives,
including joint demarches, should be developed
using in a coordinated manner all the incentives
and leverages available at the EU and Member
States' level, so as to enhance the capacity of the
EU to successfully reach the objectives of the
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility…”.
The Task Force Action point one, “Actions in
cooperation with third countries”54, directly
makes reference to GAMM as a dialogue and
cooperation with all third countries and points at
Mobility Partnerships as a way of enhancing this
cooperation, specifically with the Southern
Mediterranean neighbors.
The first country from the Mediterranean region
to sign a Mobility Partnership was Morocco.
Since it had already been signed on 7 June 2013,
the Task Force aims to continue the
implementation of the cooperation initiatives
within that framework. In terms of international
protection, the objective of the MP relates to the
compliance with duly ratified international
instruments concerning the protection of
refugees. This objective is expressed via support
to strengthen the Moroccan legislative and
institutional framework, and to promote the
capacity of the Moroccan authorities to deal with
the challenge. In addition, there is a detailed
annex of activities in which specific projects are
described, and which will be supported by MS,
EU, EASO55 and UNHCR.
A mobility partnership with Tunisia had long
been underway, but the politically volatile
54 Ibid. Specific actions in transit countries. Point 1.1.
55 One such specific example is the project
‘Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work of
EASO as well as the participation of Tunisia and
Morocco in the work of EASO and Frontex’.
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situation in the country dragged on the process.
Logically, the Task Force urged the Commission
and Member States to “sign and start
implementing the recently concluded Mobility
Partnership (MP) with Tunisia.”56 One can only
guess that this statement played a key role in
promoting its signature on 3rd March 2014, with
talks still ongoing regarding the details of the
initiatives to be included in the annex.
It was the EU’s intention to establish further
mobility partnerships with neighbouring
countries in the Mediterranean,57 including
Jordan given its strategic importance for other
Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Syria and
Lebanon). Even though the Task Force per se is
not the driving force behind that objective, it
provided new focus and impetus for the EU and
Member States to do so.
Regional Protection Programs (RPPs) have been
established in the Horn of Africa, and the North
of Africa (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), and
another one is being finalized in response to the
Syrian crisis. Here again, a heavier commitment
of MS vis-à-vis resettlement would be in order,
according to the Mediterranean Task Force.
Conclusions
Migration is now firmly at the top of the EU’s
political agenda. In 2005 the response of the
European Commission (EC) to this challenge
was the introduction of the Global Approach to
Migration and Mobility (GAMM), an
overarching strategic framework of the EU
external migration policy - revised in 2011 to
include international protection and the external
dimension of asylum, as well as the concept of
56 Com (2013) 869 final, Brussels, 4.12.2013.
57 COM(2013) 869 Final, 4.12.2013. “The launching
of new Dialogues on migration, mobility and security
with additional Southern Mediterranean countries,
notably with Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon is
also a priority.”
“mobility”. The GAMM is implemented through
several instruments (political, legal, and
operational support and capacity-building), and
relies on genuine partnership with third
countries, based on mutual trust and shared
interests.
However, its non-binding and flexible nature has
mostly translated into little engagement, often-
timid financial contributions from the MS in the
GAMM cooperation frameworks, such as
Mobility Partnerships, and a great deal of
frustration among the involved partner countries.
This calls for the roles of EU actors (EU
agencies, EC, and European External Action
Service) and MS to be more clearly defined and
for tangible engagement. Only in this way can
GAMM be implemented coherently and
honestly, and thereby pave the way for a future
common migration and asylum policy for the
EU and its neighbors.
In order to be sustainable, future migration and
asylum policy has to be evidence based as
opposed to reliance on outmoded notions. Also,
it should focus on promoting ethical recruitment,
legal and safe employment of migrants (decent
work), and improved integration measures.
Briefly, benefits to third countries in relation to
mobility should not be conditioned to co-
operation on border controls and migration flow
monitoring, but rather to the respect for the
human rights of migrants. Finally, it has to pay
particular attention to the needs and context of
its partners, if the intended objective is to build
long-term relations and to promote a genuine
two-way dialogue.
As a big bureaucratic and political animal, the
EU is slow by nature in agreeing to common
solutions and adapting to reality (e.g. Stockholm
Programme). The new EU Funds on Asylum,
Migration, and Integration (2014-2020, 3.1
billion Euro) and the Internal Security Funds
(2014-2020, 3.7 billion Euro) are new financial
vehicles to tackle the issue, but at the same time
13
they confirm that the main emphasis is still on
security.
However, if European leaders want to keep
Europe’s competitive advantage and social
standards for the coming generation, the time is
more than ripe to reshape a bold and creative
vision and policy for the migration and asylum
portfolio that takes into consideration relevant
policies (economic, employment, education,
skills, external issues, etc.), and demographic
changes.
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